The State of Utah v. James (Jim) Kourbelas : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
The State of Utah v. James ( Jim) Kourbelas : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT B. HANSEN, OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA; Attorneys for Respondent DAVID B. HAVAS;
Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Kourbelas, No. 16875 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2131
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
------------. 
. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
JAMES (JIM) KOURBELAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
. 
Case No. 
16875 
--------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING 
DAVID B. HAVAS 
Suite 216, Harrison Place 
3293 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED 
JUL 171980 
---·-······ ...................................... . 
Clerk. Supttlllt Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE------------------ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT----------------------- 1 
.RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW ANY 
IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT WHICH 
ESTABLISHES THE DEFENSE OF 
ENTRAPMENT----------------------- 4 
CONCLUSION------------------------------------------- 7 
CASES CITED 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 {Utah 1979)------------ 5 
State v. West, No. 15977 {Utah, Jan. 14, 1980)------- 4 
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 {3d Cir. 
1979)------------~------------------------- 6,7 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) {a) {ii) (1953), as 
amended------------------------------------- 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 {Supp. 1973)--------------- 5 
-i-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for d gitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16875 
JAMES (JIM) KOURBELAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
------------
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of violating§ 58-37-8(1) 
(a} (ii) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. This statute 
prohibits the distribution of a controlled substance for 
value. The controlled substance sold by appellant was 
marijuana. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty on December 19, 1979, in the First District Court, 
the Honorable Venoy Christofferson presiding. Appellant 
was sentenced on January 31, 1980, to five years in the Utah 
State Prision. This sentence was stayed and he was placed 
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on probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment 
rendered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 3, 1979, Appellant was arrested for selling 
two pounds of marijuana to Officer Mark Nelson of the Logan 
City Police Department (Te 159). Prior to the actual sale 
appellant and Officer Nelson had discussed the sale of 
marijuana at Lake Powell and in a series of telephone 
conversations. 
When' Officer Nelson first approached appellant 
about buying some marijuana, appellant said, "sure I'll see 
what I can do." Appellant gave Officer Nelson his name, 
address, and phone number, asking Officer Nelson to contact 
him (T. 128). 
Officer Nelson conversed with appellant seven times 
by phone from June 30 to July 2, 1979. Two of the calls were 
made by appellant and five were made by Officer Nelson. 
During the first conversation appellant indicated 
to Officer Nelson that he would sell the marijuana for $525.00 
a pound (T. 131). In addition, appellant suggested that he 
could contact his roommate about purchasing some LSD if 
Officer Nelson were interested (T. 131, 134). 
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During Officer Nelson's second phone conversation 
with appellant he discovered that a man named Ladell was 
appellant's supplier (T. 137). At the end of the second 
conversation the two decided to consummate the sale at 
Sherwood Hills in Cache County (T. 138). 
Appellant invited Officer Nelson to call back on 
July 1st (T. 138). When he called, appellant informed 
Officer Nelson he could only get two pounds of marijuana, 
and he had failed to contact his roommate about the LSD (T. 140). 
Later that day appellant called and informed 
Officer Nelson he had been unable to contact Ladell, (T. 142) 
and when Officer Nelson called back appellant indicated 
he still had not received any word (T. 144). By July 2nd, 
appellant had contacted Ladell and informed Officer Nelson 
that he could get two pounds of marijuana (T. 145). He also. 
indicated he would use his boat as callateral to get the 
marijuana from Ladell (T. 150). After finalizing the deal 
with Ladell appellant called Officer Nelson to establish 
the final details of the transaction (T. 151-154). 
Officer Nelson repeatedly testified that appellant 
showed no hesitancy in their conversations (T. 129,134,151, 
153,157). When Officer Nelson apologized to appellant for 
calling him appellant clearly indicated that he was not 
bothered (T. 137). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW ANY 
IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT WHICH 
ESTABLISHES THE DEFENSE OF 
ENTRAPMENT. 
Appellant's only contention on appeal is that this 
Court should find he was entrapped into the commission of the 
offense as a matter of law. 
The issue of entrapment was raised in a recent Utah 
case, State v. West, No. 15977 (Utah Jan. 14, 1980). The 
West case involved the sale of $25.00 worth of marijuana to 
an undercover security officer who inserted himself into the 
defendant's social circle, visiting the defendant 12 to 13 
times over a nine day period. The security officer admitted 
he asked the defendant "a few times" for drugs while the 
defendant claimed he had been constantly hounded for drugs. 
This Court in West stated that it would consider 
the issue of entrapment by "surveying the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the 
light favorable to the jury verdict." Id. at 3. The Court 
went on to say: 
Whether entrapment exists is like 
any other question of fact. Only where 
the evidence is undisputed, or is so 
clear and persuasive that reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon would 
necessarily so find, could the Court 
so rule as a matter of law. 
Id. at p .. 3-4. 
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Entrapment is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-303 (Supp. 1973): 
(1) It is a defense that the actor 
was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
conunission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording 
a person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), this 
Court held that Section 76-2-303 requires the application of 
an objective standard. This standard being "whether the 
police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below 
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper 
use of governmental power." Id. at 500. The test used in 
assessing police conduct is "whether the law enforcement 
official (used) • • • persuasion or inducement effective to 
persuade an average person, other than one who is merely 
given the opportunity to commit the offense." Id. at 503. 
In applying the test set forth in Taylor it is 
appropriate to consider the negotiations between officer 
Nelson and appellant leading up to the offense. The evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, does 
not show any impropriety on the part of the police. Nelson 
did not coax, badger, or apply pressure by repeatedly 
-5-
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requesting appellant to commit the offense. Nelson did:not 
appeal to appellant's sympathy or exploit a friendsh~p. Nelson 
merely approached appellant about purchasing some marijuana • 
. Appellant was open to the suggestion and responded that 
he would attempt to get the requested marijuana {T.128). 
Weeks later Officer Nelson found appellant was 
still interested in making a sale (T.131). Appellant 
agreed to sell marijuana to Officer Nelson in their first 
telephone conversation and quoted $525.00 as a reasonable 
price for the marijuana he could procure (T.131). 
Subsequent calls merely established the details 
of the transaction. Clearly, the evidence shows that Officer 
Nelson merely afforded appellant the opportunity to commit 
the offense which appellant willingly accepted. 
The record does not indicate that appellant was 
coerced or induced to act. Appellant never expressed concern 
regarding the illegality of Officer Nelson's suggestion. 
Appellant invited Officer Nelson to call him and voluntarily 
conducted negotiations preparatory to the actual sale. 
Further evidence of appellant's disposition to make the 
sale is demonstrated by his willingness to drive to Cache 
County to consummate the deal (T.138). In short, appellant 
was self-motivated not coerced into making the sale. 
Appellant asserts that United States v. Twigg, 
588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1979), supports his allegations that 
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the police conduct constituted entrapment. However, Twigg 
can be distinguished from the instant case. In Twigg the 
Drug Enforcement Agency through the defendant's friend 
induced the defendant to set up a laboratory to produce 
amphetamine. The DEA was intricately involved in the 
setting up of the laboratory; it purchased most of the 
equipment and furnished an isolated farmhouse. The 
defendants did not even know how to produce the drug. 
The Court in Twigg did not find the defendants had 
been entrapped. However, it held that the police involvement 
in the commission of the offense was so overreaching that 
prosecution of the defendant would be a violation of due 
process. The police conduct in the instant case does not 
approach the level of involvement that is demonstrated in 
Twigg. Officer Nelson did nothing to facilitate the 
procurement of the marijuana.· He merely offered to buy it. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to show that the evidence is 
so clear and persuasive that reasonable minds acting upon 
it would necessarily find entrapment. The evidence shows 
no dishonorable or unworthy police conduct. Respondent 
asserts that the rulings of the lower court were proper and 
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prays the jury verdict be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for\Respondent 
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